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UNIFIED VERSUS DIVIDED ENROLLMENT IN SCHOOL CHOICE:
IMPROVING STUDENT WELFARE IN CHICAGO
BATTAL DOĞAN AND M. BUMIN YENMEZ
ABSTRACT. The Chicago Board of Education is implementing a centralized clearinghouse
to assign students to schools since 2018-19 admissions. In this clearinghouse, each student
can simultaneously be admitted to a selective and a nonselective school. We study this
divided enrollment system and show that an alternative unified enrollment system, which elicits
the preferences of students over all schools and assigns each student to only one school, is
better for students when choice rules of schools are substitutable. If the choice rule of a school
is not substitutable, then there exist student preferences such that at least one student strictly
prefers the divided enrollment system to the unified enrollment system. Furthermore, we
characterize the sources of inefficiency in the divided enrollment system when choice rules
of schools are substitutable.
1. Introduction
Market design has been especially successful in assigning students to public schools. In
an influential study, Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) have introduced market design
as a tool in this context, shown that some school districts use deficient mechanisms,
and proposed better alternatives. Since then many US school districts including Boston,
Denver, Detroit, New Orleans, New York City, Newark, and Washington D.C. have either
established centralized clearinghouses or reformed their existing systems.
In April 2017, the Chicago Board of Education voted unanimously to implement a
centralized clearinghouse to assign students to schools. Some of these schools are called
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‘selective’ and use standardized testing for admissions, while the rest are ‘nonselective,’
district-run public schools that may include magnet and neighborhood schools. Prior to
April 2017, the admissions to selective schools were centralized whereas the admissions
to nonselective schools were not. In the current system, each student is admitted to a
selective and a nonselective school. We call this the divided enrollment system because a
student can be assigned to more than one school in the clearinghouse. Instead, we propose
a unified enrollment system in which each student can be assigned to only one school.
We study divided and unified enrollment systems for student assignment when there are
different types of schools; we show that the unified enrollment system is better for students
than the divided one when choice rules of schools are substitutable which requires that a
student admitted from a set of applicants is also admitted from any subset of applicants
including her. Therefore, we show that the current system in Chicago can be improved for
students by moving to the unified enrollment system. Furthermore, the unified system
can be established easily, using the existing mechanisms, with only one change: Instead
of eliciting the preferences of students over selective and nonselective schools separately,
students’ preferences over all schools are elicited.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the student-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm (SPDA) of Gale and Shapley (1962) is used to assign students to schools in the
unified enrollment system or for each type of school in the divided enrollment system.
As far as we know, all of the aforementioned school districts currently use this algorithm.
We show that either the outcome of the unified enrollment system Pareto dominates
the outcome of the divided enrollment system or they are the same when choice rules
are substitutable (Theorem 1). When there exists one school with a choice rule that is
not substitutable, we construct student preferences such that at least one student strictly
prefers the divided enrollment outcome to the unified enrollment outcome (Theorem 2).
Therefore, substitutability is a necessary and sufficient condition for the student welfare
comparison to hold for all student preferences between the two enrollment systems.
Our Theorem 1 generalizes Theorem 2 of Manjunath and Turhan (2016), which requires
choice rules to be responsive. A school choice rule is responsive if the school has a priority
ranking over students and chooses the highest priority students up to the capacity. Choice
rules of selective schools in Chicago are substitutable but not responsive. Selective schools
in Chicago have an affirmative action policy that divides students into four tiers in terms of
socioeconomic status: Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3, and Tier 4. Each school reserves some seats for
every tier, as well as some seats to be assigned purely based on students priority, and seats
are allocated in turn according to a specific precedence order.1 Although these choice rules
are substitutable (Echenique and Yenmez, 2015), they are not responsive since a student
1See Dur et al. (2016) for a detailed description of the choice process.
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who is allocated a seat reserved for his tier can override the priority of another student
who does not belong to the same tier.
The fact that the unification of the enrollment system brings about efficiency gains is in
line with prior market-design experiences in which centralization brings about efficiency
gains. Yet, the exact sources of efficiency gains from centralization had been relatively less
understood. Here, we also characterize the sources of inefficiency in the divided enrollment
system, which provides some insights on the efficiency gains from centralization under
substitutable choice rules. We identify three reasons for the inefficiency resulting from a
divided enrollment system. One obvious reason is that some of the seats may be wasted,
as a student can get into two or more schools but can accept only one. However, the
inefficiency of the divided enrollment system is not limited to this waste. A second possible
reason of inefficiency is miscoordination. In the divided enrollment system, two students
may end up applying to the same pair of schools and block each other from receiving
more preferred schools, while the unified enrollment system would have coordinated their
preferences and they would not have applied to each other’s more preferred schools. A
third possible reason of inefficiency is a new interrupter. In the divided enrollment system, a
student may apply to a school that he would not have applied to in the unified enrollment
system, and interrupt the admission process of the school eventually not receiving an offer
from that school but hurting some other students.2 We show that the entire efficiency
loss due to the divided enrollment is characterized by the above three possible reasons
(Theorem 3).
All our results generalize so that two enrollment systems can be compared in terms of
student welfare when one enrollment system has a finer partition of schools than the other
one. For example, when the partition of schools becomes finer students are worse off if
choice rules of schools are substitutable. On the other hand, if there exists a school with a
choice rule that is not substitutable, then there exist student preferences such that a finer
partition of schools makes at least one student better off. Likewise, the efficiency loss due
to a finer partition of schools can be characterized as before.
Related Literature. An important feature of our model is the coexistence of two central-
ized enrollment systems involving the same set of students. Manjunath and Turhan (2016)
also consider a model with the same feature and show that the divided enrollment system
cannot always avoid waste (in their Theorem 1) and cannot always coincide with the
unified enrollment outcome (in their Corollary 1). More relatedly, a special case of our
Theorem 1 that the unified enrollment system Pareto improves over the divided enroll-
ment system can be shown using their Theorem 2. Turhan (2019) studies the mechanism
2Even in the unified enrollment system, there may be interrupters (Kesten, 2010). The divided enrollment
system may bring new interrupters, which is the third source of inefficiency that we are pointing out.
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introduced in Manjunath and Turhan (2016) when there are different partitions of schools
and analyzes the welfare and incentive implications when the partition becomes finer. In a
complimentary work. Ekmekci and Yenmez (2019) study the incentives of schools to join a
common enrollment system.
Another way to alleviate inefficiency of the divided enrollment system is to introduce
additional stages of assignment. Manjunath and Turhan (2016) analyze this possibility
when a unified enrollment system is not possible and show that with enough repetition a
stable matching is attained for a particular dynamic mechanism. The college admissions in
France features a unified enrollment system with multiple stages. Like the current system
in Chicago, there are selective and nonselective schools. In a companion paper, we study
when an additional stage improves welfare in a unified enrollment system (Doğan and
Yenmez, 2018). For nonselective schools in France, there are no priorities. Bonkoungou
(2017) studies different tie-breaking rules in a static setting and shows that there is no
strategy-proof tie-breaking rule and further studies the incentive properties of these rules.
On the other hand, Haeringer and Iehlé (2017) focus on the multiple-stage feature of the
French college admissions. They weaken stability and study mechanisms that satisfy this
stability notion. Unlike these two papers, we consider a divided enrollment system and
establish that the unified enrollment system is better for students.
The outcome of the unified enrollment system can be inefficient for students even when
choice rules are substitutable. Inded, Ergin (2002) identifies priority-capacity profiles of
schools under which the SPDA outcome is efficient. Since we do not impose this condition,
the outcome of the unified enrollment system can be inefficient in our setting even under
substitutability.
2. Model
2.1. Primitives. Let S = {s1, . . . , s|S|} be a set of students and C = {c1, . . . , c|C|} be a set
of schools. Each school has a type. In our motivating Chicago Public School application,
there are two school types: selective and nonselective. In general, there are K ≥ 2 school
types. The set of type-k schools is nonempty and denoted by Ck for each type k. Therefore,
{C1, . . . , CK} is a partition of the set of schools C.
Each student s ∈ S has a preference relation Rs over C ∪ {s},3 where s represents an
outside option for the student, which can be the neighborhood school, private school, or
homeschooling. Given c, c′ ∈ C ∪ {s}, we write c Ps c′ if c 6= c′ and c R c′, i.e., student s
3More formally, a preference relation over C ∪ {s} is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary
relation over C ∪ {s}. Binary relation Rs over C ∪ {s} is complete if, for every c1, c2 ∈ C ∪ {s}, c1Rsc2 or c2Rsc1.
It is transitive if, for every c1, c2, c3 ∈ C ∪ {s}, c1Rsc2 and c2Rsc3 imply c1Rsc3. It is anti-symmetric if, for every
c1, c2 ∈ C ∪ {s}, c1Rsc2 and c2Rsc1 imply c1 = c2.
UNIFIED VS. DIVIDED ENROLLMENT 5
strictly prefers school c to school c′. A school c is acceptable to student s if the school is
strictly better than the outside option, or equivalently, c Ps s.
Each school c ∈ C has a capacity qc ∈ N, which represents the maximum number
of students the school can admit. The admission policy of school c is represented by a
choice rule Chc : 2S → 2S , which maps each nonempty set S ⊆ S of students to a subset
Chc(S) ⊆ S of chosen students such that |Chc(S)| ≤ qc. Thus, the school cannot accept
more students than its capacity. A student s ∈ S is acceptable for school c if there exists
S ⊆ S such that s ∈ Chc(S).
The following property of choice rules play a critical role in our analysis. Choice rule
Chc satisfies substitutability if, s ∈ S ⊆ S′ ⊆ S and s ∈ Chc(S′) imply s ∈ Chc(S).
Substitutability states that when a student is chosen from a set of applicants, then she is
also chosen from any subset of applicants that includes her.
A market is a tuple (S , (Ck)k∈{1,...,K}, (Rs)s∈S , (qc, Chc)c∈C).
2.2. Solution Concepts. A matching µ is an assignment of students to schools that satis-
fies the capacity constraints:
• for each student s, µ(s) ∈ C or µ(s) = s,
• for each school c, µ(c) ⊆ S and |µ(c)| ≤ qc, and
• for each student s and school c, µ(s) = c if, and only if, s ∈ µ(c).
In words, every student is either matched with a school or matched to his outside option
(which we also refer to as being unmatched), and every school is assigned a set of students
with cardinality less than or equal to its capacity. In addition, there is a feasibility constraint
that if a student gets matched with a school, then the student is in the set of students that
is assigned to the school.
A matching µ Pareto dominates another matching ν, if for every student s, µ(s) is
weakly more preferred than ν(s) and for one student it is strictly more preferred. A
matching that is not Pareto dominated is called Pareto efficient; otherwise, it is Pareto
inefficient.
A matching µ is stable if it satisfies the following properties:
• (individual rationality for students) for each student s, µ(s) Rs s,
• (individual rationality for schools) for each school c, Chc(µ(c)) = µ(c), and
• (no blocking) there exists no student-school pair (s, c) such that c Ps µ(s) and
s ∈ Chc(µ(c) ∪ {s}).
Individual rationality for a student means that she weakly prefers the outcome over
being unmatched. On the other hand, for a school, it means that the school would like to
keep all the students assigned to it. No blocking rules out the existence of a student-school
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pair such that the student strongly prefers the school more than her match and the school
would like to admit the student.
In student-assignment settings, stability of a matching is viewed as a fairness notion
(Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003). Furthermore, the deferred-acceptance algorithm
of Gale and Shapley (1962) is implemented in school districts that have reformed their
student assignment mechanisms. The following describes how the student-proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm (SPDA) works for a set of students S and a set of schools
C.
Step 1. Each student applies to his top-ranked acceptable school in C. If
there is no such school, then she is unmatched. Each school c considers its
applicants, say A1(c). Among these, it tentatively accepts Chc(A1(c)). It
rejects all other applicants. If there is no rejection by any school at this step,
then stop and return ∪cChc(A1(c)).
Step t ≥ 2. Each student who is rejected at Step t− 1 applies to his top-
ranked acceptable school among the ones that have not rejected him. If there
is no such school, she is unmatched. Each school c considers the students
that it tentatively accepted at Step t− 1 and the new applicants at Step t,
say At(c). Among these, it tentatively accepts Chc(At(c)). It rejects all other
applicants. If there is no rejection by any school at this step, then stop and
return ∪cChc(At(c)).
The algorithm stops in finite time since there can only be a finite number of rejections.
When choice rules satisfy substitutability and a mild consistency condition, the outcome
of SPDA is a stable matching.4
2.3. Enrollment Systems. The unified enrollment system is used in various school dis-
tricts in the United States, as well as in college admissions in some countries around the
world where students are matched with schools (or colleges) in a centralized clearinghouse.
However, even though the proposed student assignment system in Chicago is centralized,
it is divided in the sense that each student can be admitted to a selective school and a
nonselective school simultaneously.
Unified Enrollment System: Each student reports a preference relation over all schools.
Then a matching is determined by running SPDA. Therefore, each student is matched to at
most one school. Finally, each student either accepts his match or rejects it (in which case
he is unmatched or matched to his outside option).
Divided Enrollment System: Each student reports, for each school type, his preference
relation over the schools of that type, so he reports K separate preference relations. Then, a
4See Aygün and Sönmez (2013) for the consistency condition.
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matching for each school type is determined by running SPDA. As a result, each student
may be matched to one school of every type (in the Chicago Public School application each
student may be matched with a selective school and a nonselective school). Finally, each
student accepts at most one school from his matches (possibly rejecting all of them).
We assume that each student submits her true preferences over all schools in the unified
enrollment system and over schools of the same type in the divided enrollment system.
Furthermore, each student accepts the most preferred school that she got into in the
divided enrollment system and accepts the offer if she gets one in the unified enrollment
system.5
3. Unified Enrollment vs. Divided Enrollment
We show that the outcome of the unified enrollment system is weakly better than the out-
come of the divided enrollment system for all students when choice rules are substitutable.
Intuitively, there is more competition for every school type in the divided enrollment
system compared to the unified enrollment system because all students compete to get
into schools of a given type even if they end up rejecting their offers from these schools
eventually. This intuition is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that choice rules of schools satisfy substitutability. Then the set of students
who have applied to a school at or before Step t of SPDA in the unified enrollment system is a subset
of the corresponding set for the divided enrollment system, for every t.6
As a result, each student is weakly worse off in the divided enrollment system than in
the unified enrollment system under substitutability.
Theorem 1. Suppose that choice rules of schools satisfy substitutability. Then every student gets
a weakly more preferred outcome in the unified enrollment system compared to the the divided
enrollment system.
Theorem 1 shows that the divided enrollment system is weakly Pareto inferior to the
unified enrollment system when choice rules of schools are substitutable. It generalizes
Theorem 2 in Manjunath and Turhan (2016) since they assume that school choice rules
5Accepting the most preferred outcome (including the outside option) is the weakly dominant action
for each student. Likewise, reporting the true preferences at SPDA is a weakly dominant strategy when
choice rules satisfy substitutability and another condition called the law of aggregate demand (Hatfield and
Milgrom, 2005). As a result, under these two conditions, both enrollment systems have a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium in which students submit true preferences at SPDA and accept the most preferable offer
afterwards, which is the outcome that we analyze.
6If t is greater than the number of steps in SPDA, then the set of students who have applied to a school
at or before Step t of SPDA means the set of students who have applied to this school at any step of SPDA.
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are responsive.7 Responsive choice rules satisfy substitutability.8 Echenique (2007) shows
that substitutable choice rules are exponentially more than responsive choice rules. In
practice, some schools have substitutable choice rules that are not responsive. For example,
when there are diversity considerations school choice rules are substitutable but not
responsive (Echenique and Yenmez, 2015). In particular, selective schools in Chicago have
substitutable choice rules that are not responsive (Dur et al., 2016).
The intuition that more competition in the divided enrollment system compared to
the unified enrollment system hurts students does not hold when choice rules are not
substitutable.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the choice rule of a school does not satisfy substitutability. Then there
exist student preferences such that at least one student gets a strictly less preferred outcome in the
unified enrollment system compared to the divided enrollment system.
When there exists a school with a choice rule that does not satisfy substitutability, a
student may be chosen from a set while she is rejected from a subset. As a result, the
additional competition for this school may make the student receive a more preferred
school. In the proof, we build on this intuition and construct student preferences such that
this student receives a strictly more preferred outcome in the divided enrollment system
compared to the unified enrollment system.
Next, we formally analyze these sources of inefficiency when choice rules are substi-
tutable and show that the entire efficiency loss due to the divided enrollment is character-
ized by three possible reasons. For this result, we assume that for each school c ∈ C, choice
rule Chc satisfies the following additional property.
Conditional capacity-filling: For each S ⊆ S and s ∈ S \ Chc(S), either |Chc(S)| = qc
or student s is not acceptable to school c.
Conditional capacity-filling requires each school to choose a student whenever there
is remaining capacity if the student is acceptable. Choice rules in the current Chicago
school choice system, which allow them to achieve diversity, satisfy substitutability and
conditional capacity-filling (Echenique and Yenmez, 2015).
Given a market, let S ⊆ S be the set of students who are matched to different schools at
the outcome of the divided enrollment system and the outcome of the unified enrollment
system. Note that, students in S are worse off in the divided enrollment system by
Theorem 1, i.e., they suffer from divided enrollment. Let µu denote the outcome of the
unified enrollment system and let µd denote the outcome of the divided enrollment system.
7A school choice rule is responsive if it has a priority ranking over students and chooses the best acceptable
students up to the capacity.
8See Chambers and Yenmez (2018) for a characterization of responsive choice rules using substitutability.
UNIFIED VS. DIVIDED ENROLLMENT 9
The first source of inefficiency is due to waste. A student who has a relatively higher
priority at two types of schools may receive offers from two schools, and a seat at the
school that he ends up rejecting may be wasted if there is another student who prefers that
school to schools that make him offers. In fact, the waste can hurt a chain of students if
the student who loses his seat due to waste ends up taking the seat of another student at
another school, and so on. We formalize this below.
Say that a student s ∈ S suffers from waste if there exists a list of students (s1, . . . , sn)
such that s1 = s and
(1) in the divided enrollment outcome, each student in the list receives the unified
enrollment school of the preceding student, i.e., for each i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, µd(si) =
µu(si−1),
(2) for each student in the list except student sn, the school that he is assigned to in the
unified enrollment outcome does not have an empty seat in the divided enrollment
outcome, i.e., for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, if µu(si) = c, then |µd(c)| = qc, and
(3) the school that student sn is matched to in the unified enrollment outcome has
an unassigned seat at the divided enrollment outcome, i.e., if µu(sn) = c, then
|µd(c)| < qc.
The second source of inefficiency is due to miscoordination. Suppose that there are two
students s and s′, and two schools c and c′ that have different types. Suppose also that
student s prefers school c to school c′ and student s′ prefers school c′ to school c. In the
divided enrollment system, they may end up applying to both schools and block each
other from receiving more preferred schools, while the unified enrollment system would
have coordinated their applications and they would not have applied to each other’s more
preferred schools. In fact, this type of inefficiency can also happen through a longer cycle
of students as follows.
Say that a student s ∈ S suffers from miscoordination if there exists a list of students
(s1, . . . , sn) such that s1 = s and
(1) in the divided enrollment outcome, each student in the list receives the unified
enrollment school of the preceding student, i.e., for each i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, µd(si) =
µu(si−1), and student s1 receives the school that student sn receives in the unified
enrollment system, that is, µd(s1) = µu(sn),
(2) for each student the school that he is assigned to in the unified enrollment outcome
does not have an empty seat in the divided enrollment outcome, i.e., for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if µu(si) = c then |µd(c)| = qc, and
(3) there exists a student in the list whose unified enrollment school has a different
type than the type of the unified enrollment school of another student in the list.
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The third source of inefficiency is due to a new interrupter. In the divided enrollment
system, a student may apply to a school that he would not have applied to in the unified
enrollment system, and interrupt the admission process of the school eventually not
receiving an offer from that school but hurting some other students.
Say that student s is an interrupter for student s′ at school c if there is a step at SPDA
where student s is tentatively accepted by school c and student s′ is rejected, while at a
later step student s is also rejected (Kesten, 2010). Whenever such a student s′ exists, we
also simply say that student s is an interrupter at school c. Note that according to this
definition, student s could be accepted by the school for the first time at an earlier step
without rejecting any student, but the school may reject another student at a later step
while still accepting student s. In this case, student s would still be an interrupter if she is
rejected at a later step.
Say that a student s ∈ S suffers from a new interrupter if there exists a list of students
(s1, . . . , sn) and a student s∗ such that s1 = s and
(1) in the divided enrollment outcome, each student in the list receives the unified
enrollment school of the preceding student, i.e., for each i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, µd(si) =
µu(si−1), and student s1 receives the unified enrollment school of student sn, i.e.,
µd(s1) = µu(sn),
(2) for each student the school that he is assigned to in the unified enrollment outcome
does not have an empty seat in the divided enrolment outcome, i.e., for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if µu(si) = c, then |µd(c)| = qc,
(3) the unified enrollment schools of all the students in the list are of the same type,
and
(4) student s∗ is an interrupter for a student s′ ∈ {s1, . . . , sn} at the unified enrollment
school of s′.
Theorem 3. Suppose that choice rules of schools satisfy substitutability and conditional capacity-
filling. Then each student whose unified and divided enrollment schools are different either suffers
from waste, miscoordination, or a new interrupter.
The following examples show the independence of the three sources of inefficiency. In
each example, each school has capacity one and the choice rule of each school is responsive
to its priority ordering over students, that is, from each set of students, it chooses the
highest-priority student.
Example 1. (Suffering only from waste.) Let S = {s1, s2} and C = {c1, c2}. Each school
has capacity one. Suppose that schools c1 and c2 have different types. Let the student
preference profile R and the school priority profile  be depicted as below.
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Rs1 Rs2 c1 c2
c1 c2 s2 s2
c2 c1 s1 s1
s1 s2
Note that student s1 suffers from waste because student s2 is accepted to both schools
and chooses school c2. Therefore, there is an empty seat at school c1 while student s1 is
unmatched. Furthermore, no student suffers from miscoordination or a new interrupter.
Example 2. (Suffering only from miscoordination.) Let S = {s1, s2} and C = {c1, c2}. Each
school has capacity one. Suppose that schools c1 and c2 have different types. Let the
student preference profile R and the school priority profile  be depicted as below.
Rs1 Rs2 c1 c2
c1 c2 s2 s1
c2 c1 s1 s2
s1 s2
Note that students s1 and s2 suffer from miscoordination because in the unified enrollment
system they both apply to and get matched with their top-ranked schools whereas in the
divided enrollment system they both apply to schools c1 and c2 and get matched with their
second-ranked schools. Furthermore, no student suffers from waste or a new interrupter.
Example 3. (Suffering only from a new interrupter.) Let S = {s1, s2, s3} and C = {c1, c2, c3}.
Each school has capacity one. Suppose that schools c1 and c2 have the same type and
school c3 has a different type. Let the student preference profile R and the school priority
profile  be depicted as below.
Rs1 Rs2 Rs3 c1 c2 c3
c3 c1 c2 s3 s2 s3
c1 c2 c1 s1 s3 s1
s1 s2 s3 s2 s1 s2
Note that students s2 and s3 suffer from a new interrupter. The reason is that in the unified
enrollment system all students apply to their top-ranked schools and get matched with
them whereas in the divided enrollment system student s1 applies to school c1 and as
a result causes a rejection cycle in which student s2 gets matched with school c2 and
student s3 gets matched with school c1. Furthermore, no student suffers from waste or
miscoordination.
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4. Conclusion
As more student assignment programs are being adapted by school districts, policy-
makers face the challenge of implementing enrollment systems. The Chicago Board of
Education has taken a big step in this direction to implement a centralized clearinghouse
for student assignment and it has decided to implement a divided enrollment system. Even
though this system is easy to use by parents because it is based on the student-proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm (SPDA) which is strategy-proof, it can produce an outcome
that is not stable. More importantly, we have shown that the alternative unified enrollment
system, which produces the student-optimal stable matching, is weakly better for all
students than the divided enrollment system when choice rules are substitutable. We
have also identified three sources of inefficiency that characterize the entire efficiency loss
due to the divided enrollment system. Our analysis has shown that seemingly natural
student assignment mechanisms may have serious deficiencies even when they are based
on well-behaved algorithms such as SPDA. However, market-design research can guide
policymakers achieve the desirable policy goals in a centralized clearinghouse.
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Appendix A. Proofs
In this appendix, we include the omitted proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, assume that c ∈ C1. Let St(c) be the set of
students who have applied to school c at or before Step t in the unified enrollment system.
Similarly, let S̃t(c) be the set of students who have applied to school c at or before Step t in
the divided enrollment system. We want to show that St(c) ⊆ S̃t(c) for every type t. We
prove this claim by mathematical induction on t.
When t = 1, each student applies to his top overall ranked school in the unified
enrollment system. Therefore, the set of applicants in the unified enrollment system to
school c is S1(c) = {s|c Ps c′ for every c′ ∈ C ∪ {s} such that c′ 6= c}. On the other hand,
in the divided enrollment system, each student applies to the top-ranked school for every
type of school. That is, S̃1(c) = {s|c Ps c′ for every c′ ∈ C1 ∪ {s} such that c′ 6= c}. Clearly,
S1(c) ⊆ S̃1(c).
Assume that the claim holds for every number smaller than t. We now show it for t ≥ 2.
Let s be a student who has applied to school c at Step t in the unified enrollment system,
that is, s ∈ St(c) \ St−1(c). We claim that s ∈ S̃t(c). If school c is the highest-ranked
school among C1 with respect to Ps, then s ∈ S̃1(c), which implies s ∈ S̃t(c). Otherwise,
if school c is not the highest-ranked school, there exists a school c′ ∈ C1 which is ranked
right above c among schools in C1 with respect to Ps. Since s ∈ St(c) \ St−1(c), school
c′ must have rejected student s at Step t− 1 or before in the unified enrollment system,
that is s ∈ St−1(c′) and s /∈ Chc′(St−1(c′)). By the mathematical induction assumption,
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s ∈ S̃t−1(c′) and by substitutability s /∈ Chc′(S̃t−1(c′)) because S̃t−1(c′) ⊇ St−1(c′) and
s /∈ Chc′(St−1(c′)). Therefore, student s applies to school c at Step t or before in the divided
enrollment system, so s ∈ S̃t(c).
We have shown that every student in St(c) \ St−1(c), is also in S̃t(c). This and the
mathematical induction hypothesis that St−1(c) ⊆ S̃t−1(c) imply St(c) ⊆ S̃t(c). 
Proof of Theorem 1. SPDA ends in a finite number of steps under both systems. Let µ be the
matching produced by the unified enrollment system and µ̃k be the matching produced by
type k in the divided enrollment system. Then the outcome for student s in the divided
enrollment system is µ̃(s) ≡ max
Ps
{µ̃1(s), . . . , µ̃K(s)}. Assume, for contradiction, that
c ≡ µ̃(s)Psµ(s).
Let t be bigger than the number of steps in SPDA under both systems and St(c) be the
set of students who have applied to school c at or before Step t in the unified enrollment
system. Similarly, let S̃t(c) be the set of students who have applied to school c at or before
Step t in the divided enrollment system. Since c = µ̃(s), s ∈ Chc(S̃t(c)). Furthermore,
since cPsµ(s), student s must have been rejected by school c in the unified enrollment
system. Therefore, s ∈ St(c). But student s is not assigned to school c in the unified
enrollment system, so s /∈ Chc(St(c)). Lemma 1 shows that the set of applicants in the
unified system is a subset of the set of applicants in the divided enrollment system for any
step, so St(c) ⊆ S̃t(c). This fact together with s /∈ Chc(St(c)) and s ∈ Chc(S̃t(c)) yield a
contradiction because Chc is substitutable. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that the choice rule of school c does not satisfy substitutability.
Then there exist students s and s′, and a set of students S with s 6= s′ and S ∩ {s, s′} = ∅
such that s ∈ Chc(S ∪ {s, s′}) and s /∈ Chc(S ∪ {s}).
Consider the following student preferences. For each student in S ∪ {s}, school c is
the only acceptable school. For student s′, the most preferred school has a different type
than the type of school c and the second-most preferred school is c. There are no other
acceptable schools for student s′. The remaining students do not have any acceptable
schools.
In the unified enrollment system, at Step 1, students in S ∪ {s} apply to school c and
student s′ applies to another school. There are no other applications. School c tentatively
accepts students in Chc(S ∪ {s}) and rejects students in (S ∪ {s}) \ Chc(S ∪ {s}). By
assumption, student s is rejected. Since there are no more acceptable schools for student s,
she is unmateched in the unified enrollment system.
In the divided enrollment system, at Step 1, students in S ∪ {s, s′} apply to school c.
School c tentatively accepts Chc(S ∪ {s, s′}), which includes student s. For the rejected
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students, there is no remaining acceptable school that has the same type with school c.
Therefore, student s is matched with school c in the divided system.
Student s strictly prefers the divided enrollment outcome to the unified enrollment
outcome. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Recall that S is the set of students who are matched to different schools
at the truthful equilibrium of the divided enrollment system and the outcome of the unified
enrollment system. Suppose that s ∈ S, i.e., µu(s) 6= µd(s), and also that student s does not
suffer from waste. Note that by substitutability Theorem 1 applies, and therefore student
s strictly prefers µu(s) to µd(s). Then µu(s) must be a school since µd(s) is individually
rational for student s. Consider the set S′ ⊆ S of students constructed by the following
algorithm. Set S′ = ∅ initially.
In Step 1, let S′1 denote the set of students who are assigned to µ
u(s) at the divided en-
rollment outcome, while they were assigned to a different school at the unified enrollment
outcome, i.e., S′1 = {s′ ∈ S : µd(s′) = µu(s)}. Update S′ = S′1.
In Step n > 1, let S′n denote the set of students such that for each s′ ∈ S′n, there exists
s′′ ∈ S′n−1 such that s′ is assigned to µu(s′′) at the at the divided enrollment outcome, while
s′ is assigned to a different school at the unified enrollment outcome, i.e., S′n = {s′ ∈ S :
∃s′′ ∈ S′n−1 such that µd(s′) = µu(s′′)}. Update S′ = S′n ∪ S′n−1.
Since there are finitely many students, there exists a step M such that S′M = ∅ and S
′ is
constant after step M, where we stop the algorithm.
We claim that s ∈ S′. Since student s does not suffer from waste, for each s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {s},
the capacity of µu(s′) must be full at the divided enrollment outcome. Let C = {c ∈ C :
∃s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {s} such that µu(s′) = c} be the set of unified enrollment schools of S′ ∪ {s}.
For each c ∈ C, let H(c) denote the set of students who are not assigned to school c at the
unified enrollment but are assigned to school c at the divided enrollment. Since for each
s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {s}, the capacity of µu(s′) is full at the divided enrollment outcome and µu(s′) 6=
µd(s′), we have | ∪c∈C H(c)| ≥ |S′ ∪ {s}|. But also, by construction ∪c∈CH(c) = S′, which
implies that s ∈ S′.
Since s ∈ S′, there exists a list of students, including student s, satisfying the first
two properties described in the definition of miscoordination. If there exists a student
in the list whose unified enrollment school belongs to a different type than the unified
enrollment school of another student in the list, then student s suffers from miscoordination.
Otherwise, the list satisfies the properties 1, 2, and 3 in the definition of a new interrupter.
Note that the unified enrollment schools of all the students in the list are of the same type.
Let t be the first step in SPDA for schools of this type in the divided enrollment system
where a student in the list, say student s′, is rejected by his unified enrollment school, say
school c. Note that s′ is acceptable for school c, and by conditional capacity-filling, the
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capacity of c is full at the end of Step t. Note that the student succeeding student s′ in
the list receives school c in the divided enrollment system, and moreover, he applies to
and gets accepted by school c after Step t, since t is the first step in SPDA for schools of
this type in the divided enrollment system where a student in the list is rejected by his
unified enrollment school. But then, there exists a student s∗ who is temporarily accepted
by school c at Step t and is rejected by school c after Step t. But then, student s∗ is an
interrupter for s′ at school c. Thus, student s suffers from a new interrupter. 
